USA v. Craig Claxton by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-18-2014 
USA v. Craig Claxton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Craig Claxton" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 856. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/856 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 12-3933 
______ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CRAIG CLAXTON, 
                                      Appellant 
______ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court  
of the Virgin Islands 
(D. VI. No. 3-06-cr-00080-009) 
District Judge:  Honorable Curtis V. Gomez 
______ 
 
Argued on Monday, December 9, 2013 
Before:  FISHER, COWEN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 18, 2014) 
 
 
 
Susan B. Moorehead, Esq.  (ARGUED) 
Smock & Moorehead 
No. 11A Norre Gade 
 2 
P.O. Box 1498 
St. Thomas, VI 00804 
 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
 
Nelson L. Jones, Esq.  (ARGUED) 
Office of United States Attorney 
5500 Veterans Building, Suite 260 
United States Courthouse 
St. Thomas, VI 00802 
 
Counsel for Appellee 
 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge 
 Defendant Craig Claxton appeals his conviction and 
sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 
cocaine from 1999 to 2005, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841.  
The allegations against Claxton and several co-defendants 
stem from a wide-ranging drug conspiracy involving the 
importation of large quantities of cocaine from the British 
Virgin Islands to the Territory of the Virgin Islands and 
ultimately to the United States mainland.  Claxton raises five 
challenges to various aspects of the proceedings in the 
District Court.  We will affirm his conviction and sentence. 
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I. 
 This case has a lengthy history involving several co-
defendants and multiple appearances before this Court.  The 
case commenced on December 19, 2006, when a federal 
grand jury returned a fourteen-count indictment charging 
Claxton in Count One
1
 with conspiring to possess with intent 
to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine between 1999 
and 2005, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 
(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II).  A warrant was issued that day for Claxton’s 
arrest.   
A. The first trial and Claxton’s arrest 
 
 The first jury trial commenced on September 5, 2007 
without Claxton’s participation because he had not yet been 
arrested.  Two of Claxton’s co-defendants were found guilty 
during the first trial, and a mistrial was declared as to the 
remaining co-defendants.  Prior to retrial, Swann and Mark 
appealed the denial of their motion to dismiss the indictment 
and Mark filed a motion for a stay of the trial.  We granted 
the motion to stay on January 22, 2008, and ultimately 
affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss.  United States v. 
Mark, 284 F. App’x 970 (3d Cir. 2008).  We denied a petition 
for rehearing en banc on August 19, 2008.   
 While the appeal was pending, Claxton was arrested 
on April 23, 2008 in Orlando, Florida.  He waived his right to 
a removal hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 5(c)(2), and was ordered transferred to the District 
of the Virgin Islands on April 25, 2008.  On that date he was 
                                              
1
 The indictment also charged Gelean Mark, Vernon Fagan, 
Walter Ells, Kelvin Moses, Kerry Woods, Henry Freeman, 
Glenson Isaac, Everette Mills and Dorian Swann. 
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transported to Guaynabo MDC in Puerto Rico, where he was 
held until the transfer to the Virgin Islands was completed on 
July 16, 2008.  Claxton was arraigned on July 21, 2008, at 
which time he entered a plea of not guilty.  The District Court 
ordered his continued detention that same day. 
B. Proceedings involving Claxton 
 Claxton moved to dismiss the charge against him on 
October 23, 2009 on the grounds that the proceedings 
violated both the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 3161 (“STA”).  At a motions hearing held on 
March 23, 2010, the District Court denied the motion for 
relief with respect to the Sixth Amendment, but declined to 
hear argument on the STA, noting that it would render a 
written decision based upon the parties’ submissions.  A 
review of the record reveals that the District Court never 
entered a written opinion.  Claxton renewed his STA motion 
on May 20, 2010, which the District Court denied prior to 
trial. 
 Claxton also joined in a motion to continue the trial 
based upon pre-trial publicity on May 14, 2010.  The moving 
defendants objected to having the trial commence two weeks 
after the completion of a racketeering trial involving Gelean 
Mark and Police Officer Jerome Blyden (the “Mark/Blyden 
trial”).  That case involved charges of drug dealing, gambling, 
and dog fighting, and featured the testimony of three 
cooperating witnesses:  James Springette, Elton Turnbull, and 
Glenson Isaac.  Each of those witnesses would ultimately 
testify in Claxton’s case.  The motion argued that prejudice 
stemmed from media reports about the Mark/Blyden trial, 
even though Mark was ultimately dismissed as a defendant in 
Claxton’s case on May 24, 2010.  Counsel for the moving 
defendants specifically referenced an organizational chart 
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used in the Mark/Blyden trial that was broadcast on a news 
station and had Claxton’s name on it.  The District Court 
denied the motion, stating: 
In the Court’s view, voir dire will 
address the concerns and ensure 
that we have a jury that can be fair 
and impartial.  Since the 
touchstone is not whether 
someone has read something or 
heard something, but whether 
they can maintain fairness and 
impartiality.   
 
I know there has been some 
concern because Mr. Mark was on 
trial a few weeks ago with this 
court.  Significantly he is no 
longer on trial in this court.  Also, 
to the extent that there was 
publicity, it seems that there was 
publicity with respect to Mr. 
Mark.  If there was some spillover 
with respect to other defendants, 
as counsel indicated this morning 
. . . the Court will try to address 
those concerns during voir dire. 
 
App. at 206-07.  The defendants also objected to selecting a 
jury from the same panel of jurors used to select a jury in the 
Mark/Blyden trial.   
C. Jury selection and trial 
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 Claxton’s trial began on May 24, 2010.  During voir 
dire, the District Court inquired into, among other things, 
whether potential jurors had read or heard anything about the 
case involving the defendants.  Only one juror had.  The 
District Court excused that juror for cause along with another 
juror who participated in voir dire in the Mark trial. 
 The government presented the testimony of James 
Springette and Elton Turnbull in its case-in-chief.  Springette 
testified that he had been involved in drug trafficking in the 
Virgin Islands prior to 1999 and that the alleged conspiracy in 
Claxton’s case began in 1999.  Turnbull testified that he 
managed the collection and distribution of the cocaine after it 
arrived in the United States.  During his testimony, he made 
reference to numerous letters he had written to the United 
States Attorney’s Offices (“USAO”) in North Carolina and 
the Virgin Islands, other federal law enforcement authorities 
in North Carolina, and the District Court.   
Following Turnbull’s direct examination, Claxton and 
his co-defendants requested copies of those letters.  The 
Virgin Islands USAO provided the defendants with four 
letters written by Turnbull the next day.  After further review, 
the North Carolina USAO admitted that they had 
inadvertently overlooked a file containing letters written by 
Turnbull and immediately faxed those documents to the 
Virgin Islands USAO.  The letters were provided to the 
defendants on the evening of May 25, 2010, and the 
corresponding envelopes were provided on May 27, 2010.  
Upon reviewing the letters, the District Court stated: 
It seems to me with Mr. Turnbull . 
. . there are three basic things he’s 
concerned with.  One is witness 
protection . . . which is something 
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I don’t think you want the jury to 
be considering . . . .  Two, he 
wants witness fees for his 
testimony . . . [a]nd the other 
thing, which seems to be that he 
wants to get a Rule 35 . . . But the 
first and the last thing I mentioned 
seem to be connected.  He says, “I 
have testified and put myself in 
great peril . . . I’ve lost my family 
. . . I’ve lost this, I’ve lost that.”  
And so you are correct, he wants 
to get a Rule 35.  But I haven’t yet 
seen or heard anything from you 
that says that, “I will testify.  Now 
give me a Rule 35.”  [Y]ou’re 
going to get to inquire and you’re 
going to get plenty of leeway 
from the Court, given the timing 
of this disclosure.  But I’m just 
pointing out to you that . . . in 
every letter that I have recently 
just pulled up, it seems that he is 
saying [the same thing].  I’m not 
going to do anything that would 
cause you to prejudice your 
client’s right to a fair defense.  So 
you take as much time as you 
need [to prepare]. 
 
Trial Tr. May 27, 2010 (ECF No. 1137-2), at 106-17.  The 
District Court ultimately permitted the defendants to cross 
examine Turnbull and Springette regarding the letters. 
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 On May 26, 2010, Juror 125 informed the District 
Court that she had been approached by an individual who 
offered her $1,500 to say “nitroglycerin,” which she was told 
meant “not guilty.”  Juror 125 testified that she knew the 
person by sight and told the District Court the person’s full 
name.  Juror 125 also revealed that she had discussed the 
event with her brother, sister, and Juror 159.  The District 
Court inquired into these events with Jurors 125 and 159, and 
received assurances from both that they could remain fair and 
impartial.  The defendants moved for removal of the two 
affected jurors, or, alternatively, for a mistrial.  The District 
Court denied the motion for a mistrial, but did not rule on the 
motion to remove.  It did, however, sequester the jury from 
that point forward.  Jurors 125 and 159 ultimately did not 
participate in the jury’s deliberations. 
 During trial the government presented evidence of 
thirty kilograms of cocaine seized in September 2003 by 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement at the Cyril E. King 
Airport in St. Thomas.  Isaac testified that the cocaine seized 
in September 2003 was part of the cocaine importation 
scheme, that some of that cocaine was intended to be 
delivered to him, and that Mark advised him of the seizure 
when it occurred.  Isaac testified that after he received the 
drugs he relied upon female couriers to carry the drug 
proceeds back to the Virgin Islands.  He identified Claxton as 
a member of the organization whose role was to pick up the 
female couriers from the airport to transport the money to 
Mark, after which Claxton would check them into a hotel and 
make sure the couriers were paid.   
D. Judgment of acquittal 
 Claxton moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 at the close of the 
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government’s case.  The District Court expressed concern 
about the sufficiency of the evidence against Claxton, but 
reserved judgment on the motion and submitted the case to 
the jury.  Thereafter, the jury found Claxton guilty. 
 Claxton also sought a new trial pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 on the grounds that certain 
evidence was improperly admitted and that the government 
had improperly withheld certain documents during trial.  On 
September 24, 2010, Claxton supplemented his new trial 
motions and requested a hearing pursuant to the Supreme 
Court decision in Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 
(1954).  He contended that he learned after trial that one of 
the jurors, Juror 161, had previously worked at the Virgin 
Islands Housing Authority with government witness Mark 
Joseph and failed to disclose this relationship during voir 
dire. 
 The District Court heard arguments on Claxton’s Rule 
29 motion on several occasions between the final day of trial 
and the May 11, 2011 sentencing hearing, at which time the 
District Court granted the motion.  In granting the judgment 
of acquittal, the District Court failed to address Claxton’s 
outstanding motions for a new trial.  The government 
appealed, and this Court reversed the judgment of acquittal 
and remanded to the District Court.  We held that the 
evidence was sufficient to establish Claxton’s involvement in 
the charged conspiracy and that Claxton knew he was 
participating in a criminal enterprise that involved drugs.  
United States v. Claxton, 685 F.3d 300, 301, 313 (3d Cir. 
2012).   
E. Sentencing 
 Following remand, Claxton was sentenced on October 
4, 2012.  He moved for a downward departure from the 
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mandatory minimum sentence based upon cooperation he had 
provided at the government’s request in a separate conspiracy 
case.  The District Court denied the motion, and Claxton was 
sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 
months’ imprisonment.  This appeal followed. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231 and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
III. 
 Claxton raises several challenges on this appeal.  First, 
he seeks dismissal of the indictment on the grounds that the 
delay in bringing him to trial violated both the STA and the 
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.  Second, he asserts 
his right to a new trial on grounds that:  (a) he was denied his 
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury; (b) the District 
Court improperly admitted certain drug evidence; and (c) he 
was prejudiced by the government’s failure to turn over 
certain documents in violation of the rules set forth in Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150 (1972).  Finally, Claxton challenges his 
sentence insofar as he was denied a sentence below the 
statutory minimum despite having given information to 
government investigators in a separate case.  We will address 
each argument in turn, but we first address the issue of 
waiver. 
 
 
A. Waiver 
 Waiver is implicated here because the District Court 
failed to comply with  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
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29(d) when it entered a judgment of acquittal in Claxton’s 
favor.
2
   Specifically, the District Court never entered a 
conditional ruling on Claxton’s new trial motions based upon 
the admission of the drug evidence and the alleged 
Brady/Giglio violations.  Claxton never raised the Rule 29 
error in his first appeal, nor did he renew the outstanding new 
trial motions on remand.  We questioned whether Claxton 
was required to raise the Rule 29 error in a cross-appeal in his 
first appeal in order to preserve the underlying new trial 
motions and, if not, whether he had an obligation to renew the 
new trial motions on remand.  We now conclude that he was 
not required to file a cross-appeal and will consider the merits 
of his arguments despite his failure to renew them following 
remand. 
We agree with the parties that Claxton was not 
required to file a cross-appeal.  See United States v. Miranda, 
425 F.3d 953, 963 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that, despite the 
district court’s failure to enter a conditional ruling and the 
defendant’s failure to file a cross-appeal, the district court 
“ha[d] the authority, upon remand, after reversal of a 
judgment of acquittal, to consider whether it should grant or 
deny a motion for a new trial.”  Id. (citing United States v. 
Ward, 274 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001)).  The holding in 
Miranda therefore permits a defendant to renew his new trial 
motions on remand despite not having filed a cross appeal.  
                                              
2
 Under Rule 29(d), a district court is required to 
conditionally determine whether any motion for a new trial 
should be granted if the judgment of acquittal is later vacated 
or reversed by specifying the reasons for that determination.  
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(d).  Failure to make such a conditional 
ruling is error.  See United States v. Wasserson, 418 F.3d 225, 
240 n.10 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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Id.  See also Ward, 274 F.3d at 1321 (holding that when a 
court of appeals reverses a judgment of acquittal, the district 
court retains authority to grant a new trial provided the 
appeals court’s mandate only addresses the judgment of 
acquittal). 
 Unlike the defendant in Miranda (who was given an 
opportunity to raise his new trial arguments on remand) 
Claxton failed to renew his Rule 33 motions following the 
first appeal.  As a consequence, the District Court never ruled 
upon those motions and the government now maintains that 
those arguments have been waived.  We disagree because 
Claxton did preserve the arguments in his initial motion for a 
new trial so they are not, in a strict sense, waived for a failure 
to raise them at all.  Indeed, the government never raised 
waiver until we ordered the parties to address it.  In light of 
the unique procedural posture of this case, we will exercise 
our discretion and consider the merits of Claxton’s appeal by 
treating the District Court’s failure to issue an explicit ruling 
as an implicit denial of his Rule 33 motion.  See Freeman v. 
Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 
2013) (“[I]t is within our discretion to consider an issue that 
the parties did not raise below.”).  In reaching this conclusion, 
we are guided by two principles.   
First, we are unwilling to pin the District Court’s error 
in failing to make a conditional ruling on Claxton, who did 
timely file a motion for a new trial.  See United States v. 
Kellington, 217 F.3d 1084, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the 
government’s argument that the defendant should suffer the 
consequences of the district court’s failure to comply with 
Rule 29(d) and the defendant’s failure to raise that error on a 
prior appeal).   It would be wholly improper to deny Claxton 
a ruling on his new trial motion simply because the District 
Court erred in the first place by failing to comply with the 
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dictates of Rule 29(d).  See Wasserson, 418 F.3d at 240 n.10 
(acknowledging district court error in failing to make a 
conditional ruling).  The court in Kellington acknowledged 
that “[t]he right to a new trial where the interests of justice so 
require—a right which antedates the Constitution itself—
must weigh in the balance of our construction of Rule 29(d).”  
217 F.3d at 1096 n.14 (quoting our decision in Ogden v. 
United States, 112 F. 523, 525 (3d Cir. 1902), for the 
proposition that “[t]he right to move for a new trial, and to 
have that motion considered upon the reasons presented for it, 
is an absolute one, and the granting or refusal thereof does not 
rest in the discretion of the court.”).  Considerations of 
judicial economy likewise dictate that the ruling should not be 
delayed merely to give the District Court yet another 
opportunity to rule on the motions, which would result in 
further delay and possibly another appeal.   
Second, we are guided by decisions of several of our 
sister courts of appeals that have treated a district court’s 
failure to rule on an outstanding motion as an implicit denial 
of that motion.  See e.g., United States v. Jasso, 634 F.3d 305, 
307 n.2 (5th Cir. 2011) (treating a district court’s failure to 
rule on a motion for reconsideration as an implicit denial); 
United States v. Depew, 210 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(treating a district court’s failure to rule on a motion for 
employment of an expert witness as an implicit denial).  In 
Tollett v. City of Kemah, the Fifth Circuit addressed a new 
trial motion that remained outstanding on the district court’s 
docket following the entry of the final judgment in that case.  
285 F.3d 357, 370 n.* (5th Cir. 2002).  In concluding that it 
would address the motion on appeal, the court emphasized 
that “[d]espite the district court’s failure to rule, neither side 
subsequently requested that it do so.”  Id. (emphasis in 
original).  Likewise in this case, the entry of the Judgment 
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and Commitment order following Claxton’s sentencing 
constituted “the entry of a final judgment or of an order 
inconsistent with the granting of the relief sought by the 
motion [for a new trial].”  Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 
1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994).  Neither party raised this issue 
before the District Court and we will treat Claxton’s motions 
as having been implicitly denied and consider them on the 
merits.   
B. Speedy Trial Act/Sixth Amendment right to a 
speedy trial 
 Claxton raises two issues with respect to the delay in 
commencing the trial against him, one under the STA, and the 
other under the Sixth Amendment.  The essence of these 
challenges is that the time between when he was indicted 
(December 2006), and the start of his trial (May 2010),  
violated his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy 
trial.   
1. Speedy Trial Act Violation 
 Claxton first challenges the validity of the proceedings 
against him under the STA.  “We exercise plenary review 
over the district court’s construction and interpretation of the 
[STA] and its provisions regarding excludable time.”  United 
States v. Hamilton, 46 F.3d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation 
omitted).  The findings of fact to which the District Court 
applied the STA are reviewed for clear error.  Id.   
The STA generally requires a trial to begin within 
seventy days of the filing of an information or indictment, or 
the defendant's initial appearance, whichever last occurs.  
Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 497 (2006) (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1)).  Violations of the STA require 
dismissal of the indictment.  18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).   The 
STA recognizes, however, "that criminal cases vary widely 
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and that there are valid reasons for greater delay in particular 
cases."  Id.  To accommodate this need for flexibility, the 
STA sets forth periods of time that are excludable from the 
speedy trial clock.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h).  Relevant to the 
instant case, § 3161(h)(6) provides for the exclusion of a 
"reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for 
trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not 
run and no motion for severance has been granted."  18 
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6).  We have observed that, "under this 
provision, and until severance is granted, 'an exclusion 
applicable to one defendant applies to all codefendants.'"  See 
United States v. Novak, 715 F.2d 810, 814 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(quoting United States v. Edwards, 627 F.2d 460, 461 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980)), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. 
Felton, 811 F.2d 190, 200 (3d Cir. 1987) (en banc); see also 
United States v. Arbelaez, 7 F.3d 344, 347 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Because Claxton was joined as a defendant with nine other 
co-defendants pursuant to § 3161(h)(6), any exclusion 
applicable to his co-defendants will also apply to him.   
Claxton contends that 220 days of non-excludable 
STA time elapsed between his initial appearance and the start 
of his trial.  He points first to the period of time between his 
initial appearance on July 16, 2008 and a motion filed by one 
of his co-defendants on August 19, 2008 to continue the trial, 
which he acknowledges stopped the STA clock.  He asserts 
that, up until that point, thirty-three days of non-excludable 
time had passed.  Claxton also points to the period between 
January 14, 2009 and July 20, 2009, a 187-day period in 
which he claims the only motions filed were those requesting 
a trial date. 
With respect to the first period, § 3161(h)(1)(C) 
provides that delay resulting from interlocutory appeals is 
considered excludable time.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(C).  
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Claxton's co-defendants appealed the denial of their motions 
to dismiss on January 21, 2008.  We affirmed the District 
Court's decision on July 9, 2008 and, on July 23, 2008, the 
defendants filed a petition for rehearing en banc.  Those 
petitions were denied by order dated August 19, 2008.  
Therefore, the only time for which Claxton could plausibly 
claim non-excludable time was between the date of his initial 
appearance or arraignment and the date his co-defendants 
filed their petitions for rehearing—which amounts to only 
seven days.
3
   
The second period of time occurred between January 
14, 2009 and July 20, 2009.  During that time, Claxton argues 
that 187 days passed during which the only motions filed 
were those requesting a trial date.  A review of the record, 
however, reveals that much more actually occurred.  During 
that time, there were numerous emergency motions filed by 
his co-defendants requesting extensions of time to file 
responses and objections to pre-sentence reports, notices of 
unavailability, motions to continue status conferences, 
requests for hearings, and even a motion to extend the time to 
file pretrial motions.  See generally Dist. Ct. Docket, ECF 
Nos. 717-72.  These motions served to toll the speedy trial 
clock for all defendants until the District Court held a hearing 
on the motions.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) (tolling of 
STA clock occurs during time between filing of a pretrial 
motion and the required hearing on that motion); see also 
                                              
3
 Claxton claims that his speedy trial clock began to run from 
the date of his initial appearance on July 16, 2008, while the 
government argues that the clock did not begin to run until 
July 21.  For purposes of STA calculations, however, this 
dispute has no bearing on the outcome because the five days 
at issue are not sufficient to find a STA violation. 
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United States v. Tannehill, 49 F.3d 1049, 1052 n.4 (5th Cir. 
1995) (finding that where defendants requested a hearing, it 
was unnecessary to determine whether the hearing was 
“required” for STA purposes).  The record reveals that the 
District Court conducted a hearing on at least some of these 
motions at the moving defendants’ request on October 7, 
2009, at which time the District Court set a date for trial.  The 
intervening time, therefore, was excludable under the STA.  
See Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 326 (1986) 
(“The plain terms of the [STA] appear to exclude all time 
between the filing of and the hearing on a motion whether 
that hearing was prompt or not.”).  Given the complexities of 
the case, the number of defendants, and the logistics of 
bringing so many defendants to trial, we cannot say, based 
upon the record as a whole, that Claxton has demonstrated a 
violation of his speedy trial rights under the STA. 
2. Sixth Amendment speedy trial right 
 Claxton argues that his Sixth Amendment right to a 
speedy trial was violated by the government’s delay in 
bringing him to trial.  We exercise de novo review over legal 
questions in a claim of Sixth Amendment error and review 
the underlying factual findings for clear error.  United States 
v. Velazquez, 749 F.3d 161, 174 (3d Cir. 2014).
4
 
 The Supreme Court decision Barker v. Wingo, 407 
U.S. 514 (1972), set forth a four-factor test that courts use to 
                                              
4
 On April 22, 2014, we ordered the parties to file letter briefs 
addressing the impact of our recent decision in Velazquez on 
Claxton’s Sixth Amendment argument.  As we discuss below, 
we find Velazquez to be distinguishable and will affirm the 
District Court’s conclusion that no Sixth Amendment 
violation occurred.   
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examine alleged Sixth Amendment violations.  “The inquiry 
focuses on: (1) the length of the delay before trial; (2) the 
reason for the delay and, specifically, whether the 
government or the defendant is more to blame; (3) the extent 
to which the defendant asserted his speedy trial right; and (4) 
the prejudice suffered by the defendant.”  Velazquez, 749 
F.3d at 174 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31).  No single 
factor in the Barker calculus is “‘talismanic.’”  Id. (quoting 
Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 759 (3d Cir. 1993)).  
“[B]ecause of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the 
length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is 
necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the 
case.”  Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31.  Thus, “the delay that can 
be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less 
than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.”  Id. at 531.     
 Velazquez reaffirmed the need to apply the factors set 
forth in Barker when addressing alleged Sixth Amendment 
speedy trial violations and involves facts that are somewhat 
analogous to this case.  Velazquez was being investigated by 
the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) in 
Philadelphia for suspected trafficking in cocaine.  749 F.3d at 
168.  Velazquez (who lived in California) and his co-
defendants were indicted on August 2, 2005, and a warrant 
was issued for Velazquez’s arrest shortly thereafter.  Id.  Over 
the next five years, investigators did little more than 
occasionally run Velazquez’s name through the National 
Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) database.  Id. at 170-71.  
It was not until nearly six-and-a-half years later that 
Velazquez was apprehended on an unrelated narcotics charge 
and was returned to Philadelphia to face trial for the charges 
alleged in the 2005 indictment.  Id. at 173. 
 Velazquez sought to dismiss the indictment on Sixth 
Amendment speedy trial grounds, and the district court 
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denied the motion.  Id.  The court concluded that because the 
government felt that it was unlikely to locate the defendant, it 
reasonably conserved its resources and waited for further 
information before pursuing its investigation.  Id.  We 
reversed after analyzing each of the Barker factors and 
concluding: (1) the length of delay triggered the need to 
analyze all four factors; (2) the government was not 
reasonably diligent in pursuing its investigation; (3) 
Velazquez was diligent in asserting his speedy trial rights; 
and (4) the government failed to overcome the general 
presumption of prejudice that arises in cases of excessive 
delay.  Id. at 174-86.  In weighing all the factors, we 
concluded that the delay violated Velazquez’s constitutional 
right to a speedy trial, and that dismissal of the indictment 
was required.  Id. at 186.   
The parties here dispute whether Velazquez controls 
the outcome in the present case.  We will consider its 
relevance along with each of the Barker factors, below. 
 
 
 
Length of delay 
 The threshold question under Barker is whether the 
length of delay was sufficient to trigger analysis of the 
remaining factors.  This involves “a double enquiry.”  
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992).  “In other 
words, a court first decides whether the delay is long enough 
that it should trigger analysis of the other Barker factors. . . . 
If it is, the length of the delay is also separately weighed in 
the court’s analysis of the remaining factors.”  Velazquez, 749 
F.3d at 174 (citations omitted).  The length of delay is 
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measured “from the date of arrest or indictment, whichever is 
earlier, until the start of trial.”  United States v. Battis, 589 
F.3d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 
760).  “We have previously held that a delay of even fourteen 
months is sufficient to trigger review of the remaining Barker 
factors.  Id. (citing Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 760).   
In the present case, both parties concede that review of 
the remaining factors is necessary because the period of time 
between Claxton’s indictment and trial sufficiently exceeds 
the fourteen-month threshold recognized in Hakeem.  This 
factor will therefore weigh in Claxton’s favor.  Velazquez, 
749 F.3d at 174.   
The reason for the delay 
 The government bears the burden of justifying the 
delay in bringing a defendant to trial.  Battis, 589 F.3d at 680 
(citing Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 770).  “In evaluating this factor, 
we subtract the amount of delay caused by the defendant from 
the delay caused by the Government.”  Id. (citing United 
States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 184-85 (3d Cir. 1998)).  In 
Battis, we set forth the three categories of delay and the 
resulting weight each carries against the government:  (1) “A 
deliberate effort by the Government to delay the trial in order 
to hamper the defense weighs heavily against the 
government;” (2) “A more neutral reason such as negligence 
or overcrowded courts also weighs against the Government, 
though less heavily;” and (3) “a valid reason, such as a 
missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.”  
Id. at 679 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
“By contrast, delay caused by the defense weighs against the 
defendant.”  Id. at 680 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 This case presents a sparse record from which to 
determine which party has captured “the ‘flag all litigants 
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seek.’”  Velazquez, 749 F.3d at 175 (quoting United States v. 
Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986)).  Despite the 
shortcomings, the delay caused by the defendants in this case 
dramatically reduces the length of the delay we must consider 
for purposes of this element.  Claxton’s trial commenced in 
May of 2010, twenty-two months after his arraignment in the 
District of the Virgin Islands in July of 2008.  As discussed 
above, however, that delay was excusable as a result of the 
myriad motions and appeals filed by Claxton and his co-
defendants.  Such excusable delay is subtracted from the 
delay attributable to the government.  See Battis, 589 F.3d at 
680.  The remaining delay—the nineteen months between the 
indictment in December 2006 and Claxton’s initial 
appearance in July 2008—is more than offset by the twenty-
two month post-appearance delay that is attributable to the 
defendants.   
 The nineteen-month delay attributable to the 
government, moreover, is also likely justified in light of the 
record in this case.  At Claxton’s initial appearance on July 
16, 2008, the government’s witness testified that information 
obtained by government agents indicated that Claxton could 
be found in Orlando, Florida, and that agents ultimately 
arrested him there pursuant to a warrant.  The government 
witness at Claxton’s subsequent arraignment and detention 
hearing observed in response to a question about Claxton’s 
residence that: “Mr. Claxton used to reside in St. Thomas.  As 
of 2005, it’s been unclear exactly where Mr. Claxton resides.  
Otherwise, I think we’d have picked him up.”  App. at 86-87.  
Our review of the record reveals that none of the grounds 
outlined in Battis appears to be implicated in this case such 
that this period should weigh against the government.  589 
F.3d at 679-80.  Under the circumstances presented here, it 
appears as though the government promptly acted upon 
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information it obtained in the course of its investigation and 
arrested Claxton when it discovered his whereabouts.   
 More important, however, is the fact that this case is 
easily distinguishable from Velazquez.  That case involved an 
extensive record of less than enthusiastic government pursuit.  
As we pointed out in Velazquez, almost five years elapsed 
during which investigators input Velazquez’s name into the 
NCIC database only eight times.  749 F.3d at 180.  The 
government conceded that it had made a “tactical choice” to 
pursue other leads during that time, and to essentially ignore 
Velazquez.  Id. at 176-78.  This case simply does not reflect 
the complete “lack of effort by law enforcement authorities” 
at issue in Velazquez for four reasons.  Id. at 178.  First, the 
investigatory period was far shorter—less than two years in 
Claxton’s case as opposed to more than five years in 
Velazquez.  Second, Claxton’s case involved a complex 
international drug-smuggling operation as opposed to the 
more straightforward domestic drug trafficking scheme in 
Velazquez.  See 749 F.3d at 167-68 (outlining the conduct at 
issue in that case).  Third, Velazquez did not involve the type 
of delay attributable to the defendants that occurred in 
Claxton’s case—delay that offsets any delay attributable to 
the government.  Finally, the break in Claxton’s case was the 
result of police work—he was arrested after investigators 
followed up on his attempts to obtain a passport—as opposed 
to Velazquez, who was arrested on an unrelated controlled 
substance charge.  These facts, combined with the substantial 
delay attributable to the defendants in this case, demonstrate 
that the government has met its burden of justifying any delay 
that occurred.  See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31 (noting that 
delay for Sixth Amendment purposes is dependent upon the 
facts of the individual case).  This factor will, therefore, 
weigh in the government’s favor.     
 23 
Defendant’s assertion of the right 
 The third factor in the Barker analysis is the degree to 
which the defendant asserts his speedy trial right, “including 
‘the frequency and force’ of such assertions.”  Velazquez, 749 
F.3d at 183 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 529).  The parties 
both concede that Claxton has repeatedly asserted his speedy 
trial rights.  This factor therefore weighs in his favor. 
Prejudice suffered by the defendant 
 The final consideration in the Barker analysis is the 
prejudice suffered by the defendant.  The Doggett Court 
identified three types of harm that arise from unreasonable 
delay between formal accusation and trial:  (1) “oppressive 
pretrial incarceration;” (2) “anxiety and concern of the 
accused;” and (3) “the possibility that the [accused’s] defense 
will be impaired by dimming memories and loss of 
exculpatory evidence.”  505 U.S. at 654 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (alteration in original).  The Doggett Court 
also acknowledged that excessive delay can lead to a 
presumption of prejudice, but added that “such presumptive 
prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim 
without regard to the other Barker criteria . . . it is part of the 
mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the 
length of delay.”  Id. at 655-56.  See also id. at 657 (noting 
that “to warrant granting relief, negligence unaccompanied by 
particularized trial prejudice must have lasted longer than 
negligence demonstrably causing such prejudice.”).   
 Claxton claims both presumptive prejudice and actual 
prejudice stemming from the delay in bringing him to trial.  
We first find that no presumption of prejudice exists in this 
case.  In total, less than three-and-a-half years elapsed 
between Claxton’s indictment and the start of his trial.  Of 
that time, however, only nineteen months are attributable to 
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governmental delay in apprehending Claxton and bringing 
him before the District Court.  That is not substantially more 
than the fourteen-and-a-half months of pretrial incarceration 
at issue in Hakeem.  990 F.2d at 771 (declining to find that a 
fourteen-and-a-half month period of pretrial incarceration was 
per se oppressive or prejudicial).  Claxton was, of course, free 
during that entire period and by his own admission was 
unaware of the charges pending against him such as would 
cause anxiety or concern.  See Claxton Ltr. Br. May 2, 2014, 
at 5.  Doggett and Velazquez are also distinguishable from the 
present case, as those cases involved eight-and-a-half years 
(Doggett) and more than five years (Velazquez) of pre-arrest 
delay, as well as findings that the government’s efforts in 
apprehending the defendants were negligent at best.  See 
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657; Velazquez, 749 F.3d at 184-86.   
The post-arrest delay in this case was also not 
prejudicial because it was largely caused by the number of 
defendants, the extensive motions practice and the delay 
resulting from the appeals undertaken in this complex and 
large-scale drug conspiracy prosecution.  See Barker, 407 
U.S. at 531 (acknowledging that longer delays are tolerable 
based upon the seriousness or complexity of a particular 
case).  We therefore conclude that the delay at issue in the 
present case does not rise to the level of presumptively 
prejudicial. 
 Claxton next argues that he suffered specific prejudice 
stemming from the eighty-four day period that he was held in 
Puerto Rico prior to being brought before the District Court.  
He characterizes this period as “oppressive pretrial 
incarceration” that rose to the level of a Sixth Amendment 
violation.  We have held that a finding of prejudice based 
upon oppressive pretrial incarceration cannot be premised 
upon even seven months of pretrial incarceration, “absent [a 
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showing of] substandard conditions.”  Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 
760 (citing Wells v. Petsock, 941 F.2d 253, 257-58 (3d Cir. 
1991)).  Claxton has given no indication that he faced 
substandard conditions as compared to those generally 
associated with the transfer of prisoners, nor has he identified 
any decision finding that a two-and-a-half month delay 
constitutes oppressive pretrial incarceration.  See id. (seven-
month delay insufficient to be prejudicial).
5
   
Because we conclude that Claxton neither suffered 
from a presumption of prejudice nor has he identified a 
specific occurrence of prejudice, the final Barker factor 
weighs in the government’s favor.   
In weighing the Barker factors, we note that the reason 
for the delay and the prejudice factors both weigh in the 
government’s favor.  These factors certainly carry a great deal 
of weight insofar as they relate to the substantive facts of the 
case.  We do acknowledge, however, that Claxton did assert 
his speedy trial rights and that the delay was sufficient to 
trigger the Barker analysis.  Nevertheless, the fact remains 
that much of the delay at issue in this present case was 
attributable to his co-defendants’ own conduct, and Claxton 
has not shown either presumed or actual prejudice.  In light of 
these facts, we conclude that the balance weighs in favor of 
                                              
5
 Claxton’s reliance upon the STA is equally unavailing.  He 
asserts that the eighty-four day delay was prejudicial because 
it “exceed[ed] the 70 day limit contemplated by the [STA].”  
Claxton Ltr. Br. May 2, 2014, at 7.  As he is forced to 
concede, however, time during which a defendant is being 
transferred between districts is excluded from consideration 
for STA purposes, and this argument is, therefore, a non 
sequitur. 
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the government, and Claxton has not demonstrated a Sixth 
Amendment speedy trial violation.   
C. Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury 
 Claxton seeks a new trial on the basis that his Sixth 
Amendment rights were violated when he was deprived of the 
right to a fair and impartial jury.  “We analyze [a] defendant’s 
claims of lack of an impartial jury by conducting an 
independent review of the voir dire of the empaneled [sic] 
jurors to determine whether [the defendant] has demonstrated 
that ‘substantial prejudice’ arose from the publicity.”  Gov’t 
of Virgin Islands v. Riley, 973 F.2d 224, 226 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(quoting United States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 
1991)).  Our review of a district court’s investigation of juror 
misconduct, as well as its denial of a mistrial, is for abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 688 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Claxton asserts three grounds for this alleged 
violation: (1) pretrial publicity; (2) jury tampering; and (3) 
juror misconduct.  We address each argument below. 
1. Pretrial publicity 
 Claxton first argues that the publicity surrounding the 
Mark/Blyden trial, which concluded two weeks prior to the 
Claxton trial and involved an organizational chart that listed 
Claxton’s name as well as those of his co-defendants, was so 
prejudicial that he was denied a fair and impartial trial.  Our 
review of the record has revealed no evidence that Claxton’s 
trial was prejudiced by pretrial publicity. 
 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a trial by 
a fair and impartial jury.  United States v. Jones, 566 F.3d 
353, 358 (3d Cir. 2009).  Therefore, a conviction may be 
overturned if a defendant’s “trial atmosphere was so pervaded 
by publicity that no jury could be empaneled [sic] which did 
not have a preconceived determination of guilt.”  Riley, 973 
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F.2d at 226 (citing Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)).  The 
Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the “relevant 
question is not whether the community remembered the case, 
but whether the jurors at [the] trial had such fixed opinions 
that they could not judge impartially the guilt of the 
defendant.”  Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984) 
(rejecting fair trial argument even though pretrial publicity 
revealed defendant’s previous murder confession and his plea 
of temporary insanity).  Therefore, “‘[p]retrial publicity 
exposure will not automatically taint a juror.’”  Riley, 973 
F.2d at 227 (quoting United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 
985, 995 (3d Cir. 1980)).  Even in instances where a “‘juror 
has heard of or about the case and of the allegations of a 
defendant’s guilt, he may sit if he is still capable of 
abandoning his prior impressions and rendering a fair verdict 
on the evidence.’”  Id. (citing Provenzano, 620 F.2d at 995-96 
(rejecting a fair trial argument based upon jury members’ 
knowledge of certain terms such as “Mafia,” “gangster,” and 
“organized crime” used in the media to refer to the 
defendant’s case)).  The Supreme Court aptly summarized:  
“pretrial publicity – even pervasive, adverse publicity – does 
not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.”  Skilling v. United 
States, 561 U.S. 358, 384 (2010). 
 In Claxton’s case, the District Court took great pains 
during the voir dire process to ensure that it eradicated any 
potential prejudice stemming from the earlier Mark/Blyden 
trial.  Specifically, the District Court asked the venire panel:  
“Have any of you read, or heard anything about this case 
involving those Defendants?  If so, raise your card. . . . 176.  
All right.  All right.”  App. at 222.  Upon further examination, 
the District Court established as follows: 
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THE COURT:  You indicated you 
had read something about this 
case? 
JUROR 176:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  Tell us what your 
source was. 
JUROR 176:  I read The Daily 
News, the Judge report, and dem 
man say every day, and I’m pretty 
sure I read something about a 
large trafficking case, and there 
were a lot of other people 
implicated that were still left to go 
to trial. 
THE COURT:  All right.  Your 
duty as a juror is to be fair and 
impartial as you listen to the 
evidence, and to follow my 
instructions on the law.  Is there 
anything that you have read or 
seen or heard that would prevent 
you from listening to the evidence 
in this case fairly and impartially? 
JUROR 176:  I think I know one 
of the Defendants, and I know 
him to be a drug dealer, but I 
can’t tell you how that 
relationship or when I met him 
before. 
THE COURT:  I’m sorry.  You 
said who? 
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JUROR 176:  One, Mr. Moses, I 
know to be a drug dealer, but I 
can’t tell you how I know that.  I 
just seen him on the street when I 
worked at my other job. 
THE COURT:  All right.  Thank 
you. 
 
App. at 225-26.  Juror number 176 was ultimately excused by 
the Court for cause.  The District Court also excused for 
cause the one juror who attended voir dire in the 
Mark/Blyden trial.  None of the other potential jurors 
participating in voir dire in this case expressed any 
knowledge of the prior trial.  Absent such knowledge, we 
cannot say that the jury was unfairly tainted in Claxton’s case. 
 Even if other jurors had been aware of the prior trial 
(although the record is devoid of such evidence), the District 
Court further protected against potential prejudice by 
instructing the jurors that the defendants were to be presumed 
innocent until the government was able to prove each 
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jurors 
were instructed to decide the case based solely on the 
evidence presented in the courtroom, disregarding anything 
that they may have seen or heard prior to trial.  These 
instructions provided a further level of insurance against 
prejudice.  See Riley, 973 F.2d at 227 (relying, in part, on 
district court’s instructions in finding no prejudice).  Jurors 
are presumed to follow the instructions they are given, and 
Claxton offers no evidence to rebut that presumption.  E.g., 
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 799 (2001) (“We generally 
presume that jurors follow their instructions.”).  Because 
nothing in the record indicates that the jurors who were 
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ultimately impaneled had already determined Claxton’s guilt, 
or that they could not maintain an open mind in determining 
his guilt based upon the evidence presented at trial, Claxton’s 
Sixth Amendment claim with respect to pretrial publicity 
fails.     
2. Jury tampering 
 Claxton next argues that he was denied a fair and 
impartial jury as a result of the unauthorized contact with 
Juror 125, who in turn discussed that contact with Juror 159.  
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying Claxton’s motion for a mistrial because 
it conducted a thorough examination of both jurors, 
sequestered the jury for the remainder of the trial, and 
ultimately excluded both jurors from deliberations.   
 “‘It is fundamental that every litigant who is entitled to 
trial by jury is entitled to an impartial jury, free to the fullest 
extent practicable from extraneous influences that may 
subvert the fact-finding process.’”  United States v. Bertoli, 
40 F.3d 1384, 1393 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Waldorf v. Shuta, 
3 F.3d 705, 709 (3d Cir. 1993)).  In this regard, “‘any private 
communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, 
with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the 
jury is . . . deemed presumptively prejudicial.’”  United States 
v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 266 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Remmer, 
347 U.S. at 229).  This presumption is not conclusive, 
however, and the district court should conduct a hearing in 
the defendant’s presence, at which the government has the 
burden of proving that the communication did not and will 
not prejudice the defendant.  Id.  A district court has the 
sound discretion to conduct the hearing as it sees fit, but it 
“must conduct a voir dire of all jurors with whom the 
improper communication occurred that is sufficiently tailored 
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to probe adequately the possibility of prejudice.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 Claxton argues that the District Court had a duty to 
conduct a Remmer hearing of the entire jury after it learned of 
the improper contact with Juror 125.
6
  This is simply 
incorrect—Vega and Remmer instruct that courts need only 
hear from those jurors to whom the improper communication 
was made.  Id.  That occurred in this case insofar as Jurors 
125 and 159 indicated that they only discussed the incident 
with each other (along with some family members) and not 
with any other jurors.  Claxton speculates that one of the 
affected jurors might have been lying when asked if they had 
talked to other jurors, but provides no basis in the record for 
                                              
6
 Claxton relies upon the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United 
States v. Angulo  in making this argument.  4 F.3d 843 (9th 
Cir. 1993).  In that case, a juror was threatened in a phone call 
and she promptly told all the remaining jurors about the call.  
Id. at 846.  The district court in that case had to examine the 
entire jury panel because the threat “was communicated to the 
other jurors.”  Id. at 847.  Angulo is thus distinguishable 
because such communication to the entire jury panel did not 
occur in this case.   
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arriving at such conclusion.
7
  The District Court, which was 
in the best position to judge the jurors’ credibility, examined 
the jurors and found their testimony to be credible and 
consistent.  The District Court thus did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that further voir dire was 
unnecessary. 
The record also demonstrates that the District Court 
conducted a sufficiently thorough investigation and properly 
concluded that Claxton suffered no prejudice.  As required by 
this Court’s decision in Vega, the District Court questioned 
the affected jurors about their ability to remain fair and 
impartial and both reported that they could.  The record also 
reveals other objective evidence of the jurors’ ability to 
remain impartial.  See Vega, 285 F.3d at 267 (requiring courts 
to look beyond a potentially tainted juror’s subjective 
assessment of their impartiality).  Juror 125 was extremely 
candid about the improper contacts and answered all of the 
District Court’s questions in a way that it found to be 
believable.  Her candor is reflected by the admission that she 
                                              
7
 Claxton points to Juror 125’s testimony at a subsequent trial 
as being inconsistent with what she reported to the District 
Court in Claxton’s case.  This effort to impugn Juror 125’s 
testimony is of little consequence.  The District Court was in 
the best position to determine whether the jurors were 
credible, and found them to be so.  Nothing about Juror 125’s 
subsequent testimony, even if it was inconsistent, reveals that 
she told any of the other jurors about her encounter during the 
Claxton trial.  Under an abuse of discretion standard, we will 
not second-guess the District Court’s determination, 
particularly where it turns on a credibility finding that is not 
contradicted by the record before it.  See United States v. 
Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1140 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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did, in fact, discuss the contacts with Juror 159 and other 
family members.  Juror 159 was likewise the person who told 
Juror 125 to report the improper contacts to the District 
Court—thus demonstrating her willingness to follow its 
instructions.  Finally, we note the most critical insurance 
against prejudice in this case—the fact that neither Juror 125 
nor 159 actually participated in the jury’s deliberations.  In 
light of these facts, we cannot conclude that the District Court 
abused its discretion in addressing the juror tampering issue. 
3. Juror misconduct 
 Claxton’s final argument is that the District Court 
erred in failing to grant a new trial despite his allegations that 
a juror concealed a prior work relationship with a government 
witness.  Specifically, Claxton alleged that Juror 161 failed 
during voir dire to disclose that he had previously worked at 
the Virgin Islands Housing Authority with government 
witness Mark Joseph and defense witness Calford 
Charleswell.
8
  The District Court never ruled on this motion, 
and no hearing was held.  We therefore treat the motion as 
having been implicitly denied.  See Section III.A., supra. 
 “A trial represents an important investment of private 
and social resources, and it ill serves the important end of 
finality to wipe the slate clean simply to recreate the 
peremptory challenge process because counsel lacked an item 
of information which objectively he should have obtained 
from a juror on voir dire examination.”  McDonough Power 
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 555 (1984).  In 
                                              
8
 We note that Claxton was not so vociferous in pointing out 
the potential bias in his favor based upon the fact that Juror 
161 also worked with Mr. Charleswell, who was a witness for 
co-defendant Woods. 
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order to obtain a new trial on the basis of false juror 
testimony, a party must establish:  (1) that the “juror failed to 
answer honestly a material question on voir dire;” and (2) 
“that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for 
a challenge for cause.”  Id. at 556.   
 Because the District Court failed to conduct a hearing 
with respect to Claxton’s assertions about Juror 161’s past 
employment relationship with the government witness, we 
will presume that the allegations are true—i.e. that Juror 161 
failed to honestly answer the Court’s voir dire questions 
about knowing witnesses—and consider whether the second 
prong is met.  At the outset, we note that the District Court 
did not commit an error of law insofar as the law “does not 
categorically impute bias to coworkers of key Government 
witnesses.”  United States v. Mitchell, 690 F.3d 137, 150 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (declining to find implied-in-law bias when a juror 
was a coworker of police officers who testified in a criminal 
trial).  Claxton has likewise failed to demonstrate any basis 
for finding actual prejudice.  His assertions establish only 
that, at some unspecified time in the past, Juror 161 worked 
with both a government and defense witness.  The motion 
does not indicate that Juror 161 actually knew either of the 
witnesses, nor does it indicate any possible basis for bias 
beyond having shared a former employer.  We cannot say that 
the District Court abused its discretion in implicitly finding 
that this was not a basis for a challenge for cause.   
Moreover, Claxton’s allegations also fail to rise to the 
level of “clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible 
evidence that a specific, nonspeculative impropriety has 
occurred” such that a hearing was necessary.  United States v. 
Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 302-03 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  He offers nothing more than 
speculation that Juror 161even knew the witnesses, much less 
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that the juror was biased in the government’s favor—
particularly when Juror 161 also worked with a defense 
witness.   Absent such a showing, and in light of the Supreme 
Court’s admonition that we should not “wipe the slate clean 
simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process,” 
McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555, we conclude that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly denying 
Claxton’s motion and for not holding a hearing.   
D. Drug evidence 
 Claxton argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion when it admitted evidence related to the September 
2003 drug seizure because the evidence was highly 
prejudicial, irrelevant to the charged conspiracy, and was not 
probative with respect to the charges against him.  He 
maintains that there was no connection drawn between the 
drug evidence and the charged conspiracy.  We review the 
District Court’s decision to admit that evidence for an abuse 
of discretion.  United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 497 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  “[T]o the extent the District Court’s admission of 
evidence was based on an interpretation of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, the standard of review is plenary.”  Id.   
 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that a “court 
may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”  
Fed. R. Evid. 403.  Rule 403 creates a presumption of 
admissibility.  United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 323 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  When weighing the Rule 403 factors, courts 
“must appraise the genuine need for the challenged evidence 
and balance that necessity against the risk of prejudice to the 
defendant.”  Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 
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180, 186 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Evidence should not be excluded under Rule 403 “merely 
because its unfairly prejudicial effect is greater than its 
probative value.  Rather, evidence can be kept out only if its 
unfairly prejudicial effect ‘substantially outweigh[s]’ its 
probative value. . . . [W]hen evidence is highly probative, 
even a large risk of unfair prejudice may be tolerable.”  
Cross, 308 F.3d at 323 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403).   
 The drug evidence at issue here (which included 
photographs and physical evidence of the seized drugs) was 
highly probative of the government’s case and relevant to 
establishing the overall drug conspiracy with which Claxton 
was charged.  The government established the connection 
between the drug evidence and the conspiracy through 
Glenson Isaac, who testified about his participation in the 
conspiracy with Mark and about his expectation that he would 
receive a shipment of five kilograms of cocaine in September 
2003.  He did not receive that shipment, however, because 
according to Mark, the drugs “were seized [at] the [Cyril E. 
King] airport.”  Supp. App. at 12.  From this testimony, it can 
be reasonably inferred that the drugs admitted into evidence 
were the same drugs that Isaac expected to obtain.  Isaac 
further testified that Claxton “was a member of the 
organization.”  Supp. App. at 14-15.  Based upon this 
testimony, the drug evidence was highly relevant to 
establishing both the existence of a conspiracy and Claxton’s 
involvement in it, both of which the government had the 
burden of proving in order to obtain the conviction.   
 The evidence was also highly probative of Claxton’s 
involvement in the conspiracy despite his arguments to the 
contrary.  He maintains that the seized drugs were related to a 
separate conspiracy based upon inconsistencies in the way the 
drugs were transported and in the testimony from government 
 37 
witnesses.  Despite these inconsistencies—which go to the 
weight of the evidence and not its admissibility—the fact 
remains that the drugs, along with Isaac’s testimony, provided 
crucial circumstantial evidence of the existence of the 
conspiracy and Claxton’s role in it.  See United States v. 
Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2010) (drug evidence 
necessary to impute knowledge of a drug conspiracy to co-
conspirators); Claxton, 685 F.3d at 308 (affirming Claxton’s 
conviction on sufficiency of the evidence grounds and relying 
upon Boria).  In light of the probative value of the drug 
evidence at issue here, we conclude that its value 
substantially outweighed any possible prejudice to Claxton 
and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
allowing its admission.  
E. Brady/Giglio evidence 
 Claxton argues that he is entitled to a new trial based 
upon alleged violations of the rules in Brady, Giglio, and the 
Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
9
  He identifies two categories 
of letters that were allegedly not disclosed by the government 
and contain information that could have been used to impeach 
key government witnesses.  The first category involved 
twenty-eight letters sent by Turnbull and Springette to various 
government officials, including federal agents, the District 
Court, and several government attorneys (the “Turnbull and 
Springette Letters”).  Claxton sought these letters on the 
                                              
9
 Although Claxton alludes to the Jencks Act, his evidentiary 
argument focuses solely on the Brady issue.  To the extent 
that he attempts to assert the Jencks Act as a basis for a new 
trial, that argument is waived.  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 
176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) (“It is also well settled . . . that casual 
mention of an issue in a brief is cursory treatment insufficient 
to preserve the issue on appeal.”). 
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ground that they revealed Turnbull’s and Springette’s belief 
that their sentences would be shortened as a result of their 
cooperation.  These letters were disclosed during Claxton’s 
trial, and defense counsel was given the opportunity to cross 
examine Springette and Turnbull about the contents.  The 
second category involved letters exchanged between Turnbull 
and Isaac (the “Isaac Letters”), which had been the subject of 
questioning during an earlier trial but were never turned over 
by the government at Claxton’s trial.  Claxton’s counsel did, 
however, utilize the earlier testimony when questioning 
government witnesses about the Isaac Letters.  The letters 
discussed Turnbull and Isaac’s plan to “put a case” against an 
individual in an effort to take focus off another co-
conspirator.   
Brady and Giglio claims involve mixed questions of 
law and fact, and as such, we review the questions of law de 
novo and the district court’s factual findings for clear error.  
United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298, 303 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 Brady holds that “the suppression by the prosecution 
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.”  373 U.S. at 87.  A successful Brady claim, 
therefore, consists of three elements: “(1) the prosecution 
must suppress or withhold evidence, (2) which is favorable, 
and (3) material to the defense.”  United States v. Perdomo, 
929 F.2d 967, 970 (3d Cir. 1991).  “When the ‘reliability of a 
given witness may well be determinative of guilt or 
innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility 
falls within this general rule.”  Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 
(quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)).  “We 
do not . . . automatically require a new trial whenever ‘a 
combing of the prosecutors’ files after the trial has disclosed 
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evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have 
changed the verdict.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Keogh, 
391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1968)).  A new trial is only 
warranted when “‘the false testimony could . . . in any 
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the 
jury.’”  Id.    
 Claxton’s Brady argument with respect to the Turnbull 
and Springette Letters is necessarily limited, of course, by the 
fact that the government provided the letters to the defense.  
The District Court permitted additional cross examination of 
both witnesses, giving counsel “plenty of leeway” to impeach 
the witnesses and as much time as counsel needed to prepare.  
Trial Tr. May 27, 2010, at 114, 117.  To the extent that the 
jury heard the additional cross examination made with the 
benefit of the letters, therefore, Claxton cannot argue that the 
evidence was suppressed or that it was material to the issue of 
guilt because he ultimately used those materials at trial.  See 
United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 924 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(“Where the government makes Brady evidence available 
during the course of a trial in such a way that a defendant is 
able to effectively use it, due process is not violated and 
Brady is not contravened.”).   
Instead, Claxton argues that he was prejudiced by the 
government’s intentional suppression of the materials and that 
dismissal of the indictment is the appropriate remedy.  In 
Fahie v. Government of the Virgin Islands, we held that 
“dismissal for a Brady violation may be appropriate in cases 
of deliberate misconduct . . . where a defendant can show 
both willful misconduct by the government, and prejudice.”  
419 F.3d 249, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2005).  We are not persuaded 
by Claxton’s argument that this case presents an opportunity 
to impose the “rare sanction” of dismissal.  Id. at 254.   
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Claxton offers no record evidence demonstrating that 
the government in this case willfully withheld the Turnbull 
and Springette Letters.  Indeed, the letters were promptly 
turned over during trial once they were located by the various 
government agencies, all in time for Claxton to conduct cross 
examination using the materials.  Although the government 
did initially fail to promptly turn these letters over to Claxton 
at the appropriate time, we cannot conclude that this delay 
was willful or that it impacted Claxton’s due process rights, 
and we thus reject Claxton’s Brady argument with respect to 
the Turnbull and Springette Letters. 
We also reject Claxton’s contention that he was unable 
to obtain the Isaac Letters. In essence, his argument appears 
to be little more than an attempt to manufacture a Brady claim 
despite his failure to obtain the material by other means.  In 
Perdomo, we recognized that “[e]vidence is not considered to 
be suppressed if the defendant either knew or should have 
known of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage 
of any exculpatory evidence.”  929 F.2d at 973 (citing United 
States v. Torres, 719 F.2d 549 (2d Cir. 1983)).  Here, 
Claxton’s examination of Isaac demonstrated counsel’s 
knowledge of the “essential facts” of the Isaac Letters, and 
touched on many of the points counsel believed to be relevant 
to that examination.   
Moreover, counsel’s examination was undertaken 
using the transcript from the 2007 trial, in which Mark’s 
counsel conducted cross examination using the letter itself—
thus indicating that Mark’s counsel possessed the letter and 
that it was available to Claxton’s counsel independent of the 
government.  Contrary to Claxton’s assertion, therefore, it 
appears as though he could have obtained the Isaac Letters 
from a co-defendant’s counsel.  This would have obviated the 
need for the government to turn it over.  In light of these 
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facts, it is Claxton who must bear the burden of his failure to 
“‘diligently seek . . . discovery.’”  U.S. v. Dula, 989 F.2d 772, 
775 n.9 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. McKenzie, 
768 F.2d 602, 608 (5th Cir. 1985)).  We therefore conclude 
that the District Court’s implicit denial of Claxton’s claimed 
Brady violations was proper. 
F. Safety valve relief  
 Claxton’s final contention is that the District Court 
erred in finding that he did not qualify for safety valve relief 
as provided in United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(“U.S.S.G.”) § 5C1.2.  We exercise plenary review over a 
district court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines, but 
we may reject the court’s underlying factual findings only on 
a showing of clear error.  United States v. Sabir, 117 F.3d 
750, 752 (3d Cir. 1997).   
 The safety valve provision in § 5C1.2 provides that a 
district court may disregard an otherwise applicable statutory 
mandatory minimum sentence in certain drug crimes, 
provided that the five factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 
3553(f)(1)-(5) are met.  U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a).  The parties 
only dispute the applicability of the fifth factor in this case, 
which permits a district court to impose a sentence “without 
regard to any statutory minimum sentence,” provided that: 
[N]ot later than the time of the 
sentencing hearing, the defendant 
has truthfully provided to the 
Government all information and 
evidence the defendant has 
concerning the offense or offenses 
that were part of the same course 
of conduct or of a common 
scheme or plan, but the fact that 
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the defendant has no relevant or 
useful other information to 
provide or that the Government is 
already aware of the information 
shall not preclude a determination 
by the court that the defendant has 
complied with this requirement. 
 
Id. 
 Claxton raised the applicability of § 5C1.2 at the 
sentencing hearing, at which time he submitted evidence of a 
proffer session held with investigators with respect to a 
separate investigation targeting corruption in the Virgin 
Islands Police Department.  The evidence adduced at 
sentencing demonstrated that Claxton was questioned for 
approximately forty-five minutes primarily about his 
knowledge of alleged dog fighting activities.  The 
investigators did question Claxton about whether he had ever 
seen Mark or Blyden at any of the dog fights, but asked 
nothing about the drug conspiracy with which Claxton was 
charged, nor did Claxton independently offer any information 
about that crime.  At the end of the proffer session, the 
investigators met privately for approximately ten minutes, at 
which time they returned and informed Claxton that “‘[they] 
ha[d] no use for [him].’”  App. at 486. 
 Claxton maintains that the proffer session was 
sufficient to meet the requirements of the fifth element of § 
5C1.2; thus rendering him eligible for safety valve relief.  We 
disagree.  To be eligible for such relief, Claxton must have 
shown that he “provided to the Government all information 
and evidence [he had] concerning the offense or offenses that 
were part of the same course of conduct or of a common 
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scheme or plan” as the charged offense.  U.S.S.G. § 
5C1.2(a)(5) (emphasis added).  Such a showing “requires the 
defendant to reveal a broader scope of information about the 
relevant criminal conduct to authorities.”  Sabir, 117 F.3d at 
753.  Claxton bears the burden of establishing that each 
element of the safety valve criteria applies by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 754. 
 The District Court noted at sentencing that:  
[E]ven if the questions were 
propounded in the manner that the 
defense recollects, and the 
defendant answered those 
questions, if those questions have 
no bearing on the offense that’s 
being charged or related offenses, 
it seems that it doesn’t obviate the 
need for the defendant still to do 
as the statute requires, which is to 
share with the government all 
information and evidence that the 
defendant has concerning the 
offense or offenses that were part 
of the same scheme.   
 
App. at 508-09.  A review of Claxton’s affidavit reveals that 
the dog fighting activities he discussed at the proffer session 
do not appear to be related to the drug trafficking offense for 
which he was charged.  To the extent that he was asked about 
co-defendants Mark and Blyden, Claxton could only report 
having seen Mark at the dog fights.  Based upon Claxton’s 
recollection, there was no questioning about the drug 
conspiracy whatsoever.  On these facts, we cannot say that 
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Claxton has met his burden of demonstrating by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he provided “all 
information” he had regarding the drug trafficking 
conspiracy.  U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5) (emphasis added).  The 
mere fact that the investigators did not ask the “right” 
questions for purposes of Claxton’s safety valve claim did not 
relieve him of his burden under the safety valve provision.  
The District Court did not err in concluding the same, and we 
will affirm its decision. 
IV. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm 
Claxton’s conviction and sentence. 
 COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
I write separately because I believe that Claxton failed 
to preserve his Sixth Amendment challenge for our 
consideration, and I would not reach the merits of that issue.  
I join the majority’s opinion in all other respects. 
 
I would conclude that Claxton failed to preserve his 
Sixth Amendment challenge because he failed to adequately 
compose the record.  On March 23, 2010, the District Court 
orally denied his motion to dismiss on Sixth Amendment 
grounds.  The transcript of that proceeding (“the 3-23-10 
Transcript”) constitutes a necessary part of the record on 
appeal.  See FED. R. APP. P. 10(a)(2), 30(a)(1); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
30.3(a) (establishing that transcripts must be included in the 
appendix if they are “necessary for an understanding of the 
issues presented for decision”).  Although Claxton ordered 
the 3-23-10 Transcript,
1
 and although it was made part of the 
                                              
1
 See Tr. Purchase Order, United States v. Mark, No. 
06-cr-80 (D.V.I. Nov. 26, 2012), ECF No. 1402.  Notably, 
Claxton’s request for the transcript was untimely.  He filed 
the notice of this appeal in the District Court on October 9, 
2012.  He was then bound to order the 3-23-10 Transcript 
within fourteen days.  See FED. R. APP. P. 10(b)(1).  But he 
did not order the 3-23-10 Transcript until November 26, 
2012, forty-eight days later.  It appears that this, too, might 
warrant dismissal of this aspect of the appeal.  See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 11.1 (2010) (“Within 14 days after filing a notice of 
appeal, the appellant must deposit with the court report the 
estimated cost of the transcript of all or the necessary part of 
2 
 
District Court’s record,2 he has failed to include, provide 
explicit citation to, or otherwise refer to it on appeal. 
 
Claxton’s failure to include, explicitly cite, or 
otherwise refer to the relevant portions of the District Court 
record warrants dismissal pursuant to the Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 30 and related case law.  Marcinak v. W. 
Indies Inv. Co., 299 F.2d 821, 823 (3d Cir. 1962) (“Although 
all of the record is ‘available’ to the court on appeal, unless 
there is some special circumstance nothing will be noticed 
that does not appear in the appendix of the appellant or the 
appellee.”); Hornin v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 120 F.2d 
500, 504 (3d Cir. 1941); see also Abner v. Scott Mem’l Hosp., 
634 F.3d 962, 964-65 (7th Cir. 2011) (surveying cases from 
both the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit and other courts that dismissed appeals (or summarily 
affirmed district court judgments) as sanction for violating 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 30); United States v. 
Kush, 579 F.2d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 1978) (“In published 
Opinions, this court has dismissed appeals for failure to 
comply with Rule 30.”).  Such dismissal, though generally 
disfavored, falls within the exercise of this Court’s sound 
                                                                                                     
the notes of testimony taken at trial. . . .  Failure to comply 
with this rule constitutes grounds for dismissal of the 
appeal.”); Horner Equip. Int’l, Inc. v. Seascape Pool Ctr., 884 
F.2d 89, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1989). 
2
 See 3-23-10 Transcript, United States v. Mark, No. 
06-cr-80 (D.V.I. Jan. 20, 2013), ECF No. 1408.  Because the 
3-23-10 Transcript was docketed in the District Court in 
January of 2013, three months before the defendant filed the 
Joint Appendix, his failure to include, cite, or refer to the 3-
23-10 Transcript on appeal is puzzling. 
3 
 
discretion.  See FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(2); see also Horner 
Equip., 884 F.2d at 93. 
 
To be sure, dismissal seems particularly appropriate 
here.  As noted in the margin, Claxton ordered a copy of that 
transcript before assembling an appendix for appeal.  Further, 
it appears that he had ample opportunity to review and 
analyze the substance of the 3-23-10 Transcript, which was 
docketed in the District Court approximately three months 
before he submitted his appendix to this Court.  Accordingly, 
he has no excuse for failing to either point us generally to that 
document or draw our attention to specific portions of it. 
 
It has been oft-noted that “‘Judges are not like pigs, 
hunting for truffles buried in’ the record.”  Doeblers’ Pa. 
Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 820 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Albrechtsen v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 
309 F.3d 433, 436 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. 
Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam))).  
And this Court has frequently instructed parties that they bear 
the responsibility to comb the record and point the Court  to 
the facts that support their arguments.  See id.; Hornin, 120 
F.2d at 504; see also Chavez v. Sec’y Fl. Dep’t of Corr., 647 
F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Making [the] courts dig 
through volumes of documents and transcripts would shift the 
burden of sifting from [appellants] to the courts.  With a 
typically heavy caseload and always limited resources, [the 
courts] cannot be expected to do [an appellant’s] work for 
him.”); Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc. of Peoria, 388 
F.3d 990, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e will not root through 
the hundreds of documents and thousands of pages that make 
up the record here to make [the appellant’s] case for him.”).  
Because Claxton failed to heed those warnings, his appeal, 
4 
 
insofar as it relates to that failure, should have been 
dismissed. 
